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


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

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PROJECT  
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SOUTHEAST ASIA  
**REPORT**

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**ATTACK AGAINST  
AN SON NHUT  
SPECIAL REPORT**

**CATALOGED**

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**PROJECT CHECO REPORT**

**ATTACK AGAINST  
TAN SON NHUT**

Director Aerospace Division Inst ATTN: Anthony Branch Maxwell AFB, Alabama	RECEIVED	13 APR 1966	K 717.0413-8
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**P.R.C.**

**8 JULY 1966**

**HQ PACAF  
Tactical Evaluation Center**

Prepared by: SE Asia Team  
Project CHECO

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## ATTACK AGAINST TAN SON NHUT

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## ATTACK AGAINST TAN SON NHUT

During the early morning hours of April 13, 1966, Tan Son Nhut Air Base was placed under a heavy mortar and recoilless rifle attack which lasted approximately thirteen minutes. The attack, which had been well planned by the Viet Cong, was successfully executed. Two Vietnamese aircraft were destroyed and sixty-two USAF aircraft were damaged by the attack. Other damages include thirty-four USAF vehicles damaged or destroyed, an ESSO fuel storage tank demolished, and minor runway damage. There were nine military personnel killed and 184 personnel wounded.<sup>1/</sup> Although this key installation had been subjected previously to isolated acts of terrorism and sabotage by the Viet Cong,<sup>2/</sup> this marked the first occasion during the Vietnam conflict that it had actually been the target of a concentrated attack by the enemy.<sup>3/</sup>

USAF officials in Vietnam had long been concerned about the probability of a Viet Cong attack against Tan Son Nhut Air Base. It was recognized that an attack on the Air Force headquarters so close to Saigon would be an important psychological victory for the Viet Cong. As early as 1964, following the successful Viet Cong mortar attack at nearby Bien Hoa Air Base in November, Lt. Gen. Joseph H. Moore, 7th Air Force Commander, expressed a particular concern about an attack on Tan Son Nhut and had made considerable efforts to prepare for it. Intelligence reports during late 1964 had indicated that the Viet Cong were planning such an attack. The Viet Cong had been active in the area around Duc Hoa, about twenty miles west of Tan Son Nhut.<sup>4/</sup>

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In November and December 1964, General Moore had meetings with the VNAF Base Commander, the USASC-V (which had its headquarters at Tan Son Nhut) and the Senior Advisor to the Capital Military Region (CMR) which was responsible for the area surrounding Tan Son Nhut. At that time the Senior Advisor said that troop units allotted for the defense of Tan Son Nhut were less than fifty percent manned and could not provide proper defense. MACV was advised of this by General Moore. <sup>5/</sup>

While internal base defenses were being continually reviewed and dry runs conducted to reveal weaknesses, it was understood that internal defense could not prevent a mortar attack on the base. <sup>6/</sup> Overall responsibility for the protection of Tan Son Nhut was vested in the Vietnamese Air Force. USAF air police were primarily responsible for securing Air Force elements and resources. Outer perimeter defenses were a responsibility of the Army of the Republic of Vietnam (ARVN) and both regional and popular forces. <sup>7/</sup> Every effort was being made to get the responsible ARVN forces to aggressively control the perimeter area of the base out to the limits of mortar fire. <sup>8/</sup>

Base officials considered that a commando-type raid, preceded by a mortar barrage, posed the most likely threat to Tan Son Nhut. <sup>9/</sup> It was further considered that minimum protection against commando-type raids included the following measures which had been taken: <sup>10/</sup>

- (1) Wire barriers erected around all sensitive elements. These were kept under surveillance.
- (2) Trip flares and/or mines utilized in areas where surveillance was impossible or impractical.

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- (3) Defense bunkers employed to provide surveillance of all possible enemy approaches. Concealed approaches, such as ditches, gullies, etc., which did not allow constant observation, wired, and implanted with trip flares or mines.
- (4) Close areas beyond the perimeter of the base, which offered similar concealment also wired.
- (5) Numerous aircraft enclosed in three-sided revetments.
- (6) Base defense plans only provided for elements of the base defense force turning out or participating in defense actions, except in cases of self defense.

Since reliable intelligence sources indicated that Tan Son Nhut was a priority Viet Cong target, base defense was of urgent concern to air police officials. A major problem facing the defense forces was the serious personnel deficit; of an authorized <sup>713</sup>~~173~~ personnel, only 623 were assigned. The mandatory requirements for securing aircraft and other internal sensitive resources left too few men for desired perimeter security. A plan to augment the security forces with 120 non-air police personnel was off the "drawing boards" and in the administrative implementation stages just prior to the Viet Cong attack of 11/ April 13, 1966.

Over eighteen months had passed since the Viet Cong mortar attack against Bien Hoa Air Base. Meanwhile, every other major USAF air base in Vietnam, except Tan Son Nhut, had been subjected to enemy assaults. USAF officials correctly presumed that an attack against Tan Son Nhut was imminent and that the Viet Cong were merely awaiting the most opportune time. 12/

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Timing was ripe for the Viet Cong attack on April 13, 1966. It is significant to note that, for several days prior to the attack, the capital city of Saigon had been involved in serious civil disturbances stemming from the tense political situation. According to security and law enforcement officials, it was difficult, if not impossible, to reconstruct the pre-attack disposition of the Vietnamese ground defense forces who normally contributed to the external defense of Tan Son Nhut Air Base. Unknown numbers of these forces were shifted about to quell civil riots and disturbances should they arise. It was apparent that throughout the Capital Military Region, in which the city and base were located, attention was focused on the civil situation. Overall, the prevailing conditions favored the Viet Cong surprise attack against Tan Son Nhut. <sup>13/</sup>


### The Approach and the Attack

The map on the following page provides a legend of the Viet Cong attack on Tan Son Nhut. It shows the zone of approach, the positions of attack, and the withdrawal route. <sup>14/</sup>

As shown on the map, USAF officials at Tan Son Nhut later determined that the Viet Cong attack probably originated from the village of Ly Van Manh. These officials also deemed it most likely that the enemy forces withdrew along a pre-planned escape route back to the same village. <sup>15/</sup>

During the early evening hours of April 12, a small Viet Cong force, probably from the 6th Viet Cong Battalion of the 165A Regiment, moved out from the Ly Van Manh area and headed north to a fortified assembly point, as marked on the map. From there, they moved eastward until reaching

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predesignated weapons positions. A large number of visitors had been in the local hamlets from April 10 through April 12, and it was presumed that these persons joined the main Viet Cong force at the fortified assembly point. <sup>16/</sup>

At 2100 hours, on April 12, a local guerrilla element conducted diversionary harassment of a hamlet located near the approach route. This diversion, which consisted of small arms fire directed into the hamlet from the north, drew the attention of a popular force outpost nearby and permitted the main force to slip by undetected. <sup>17/</sup>

The main force then proceeded to predesignated weapons positions depicted on the map. A second guerrilla force moved into place south of the main force weapons positions to provide security for the main force both during and following the attack. <sup>18/</sup>

The first indication of possible enemy actions appeared at approximately 0026 hours, when USAF Sentry Dog Teams working in zones along the west and southwest fenceline of the base alerted, received small arms fire, and returned fire. It was later surmised that this action diverted an attempted Viet Cong infiltration. <sup>19/</sup>

The Viet Cong weapons positions then opened barrage fire with the first rounds hitting the base at 0027 hours. The barrage lasted approximately thirteen minutes during which time no less than 245 rounds hit the base. <sup>20/</sup>

It was determined that at least three 75mm recoilless rifles and ten 81mm and 82mm mortars were employed by the Viet Cong. <sup>21/</sup> The enemy attack positions, as depicted on the map on page 5 were as follows: <sup>22/</sup>

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- (1) Two 81mm mortars positioned at a distance to center of the base - 4,200 meters (4,593 yards), and to the heliport - 2,400 meters (2,623 yards). Maximum range of the 81mm mortar - 3,600 meters (over 4,000 yards).
- (2) Four 81mm mortars positioned at a distance to center of the base - 3,350 meters (3,663 yards), to the heliport - 2,075 meters (2,267 yards). Maximum range of the 81mm mortar was 3,600 meters (over 4,000 yards).
- (3) Four 82mm mortars and three 75mm recoilless rifles positioned at a distance to the center of the base - 4,900 meters (5,358 yards), to the heliport - 3,400 meters (3,716 yards), and approximately 3,000 meters (3,379 yards) to the perimeter of the base. The maximum range of the 82mm mortar was 3,034 meters (3,320 yards), and the maximum range of the 75mm recoilless rifle was 6,565 meters (7,180 yards).

The 81mm and 82mm mortar rounds were mixed and fell generally west of the north-south runway; the 75mm recoilless rifle rounds fell generally east of the north-south runway. Plotting of the rounds indicated conclusively that the aircraft parking areas and other operating installations adjacent to taxiways and runways, as well as the 120th Aviation Company, were primary targets. <sup>23/</sup>

### The Damage and the Casualties

The Viet Cong struck with deadly accuracy. Part of the heavy barrage landed in a fuel storage area, and one tank of fuel exploded in flames. The flames soared hundreds of feet into the night sky, joining flares dropped by Air Force flareships in lighting the area. Air Force firemen quickly fought to contain the blazing fuel stores and extinguished fires at other points on the base. <sup>24/</sup>

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The pinpoint accuracy of the barrage caused considerable damage to aircraft at Tan Son Nhut. In some cases there were direct hits, in other instances the mortar shells landed directly in front of the revetted aircraft and many small pieces of shrapnel penetrated the aircraft. <sup>25/</sup>

Two RF-4C's parked in revetments suffered direct hits from mortar shells, two Vietnamese C-47 aircraft were destroyed, and sixty-one USAF aircraft were damaged. <sup>26/</sup>

Thirty-four USAF vehicles were damaged or destroyed, an ESSO fuel storage tank was destroyed, several hutments were damaged, and there was minor runway damage. <sup>27/</sup>

Also, as a result of the attack, there were nine military personnel killed and 184 personnel wounded in action. The breakdown of casualties was as follows: <sup>28/</sup>

- (1) Killed in action: six U.S. Army, one U.S. Navy, and two Vietnamese personnel.
- (2) Wounded in action: 94 U.S. Army and 90 U.S. Air Force personnel.

It was reported on April 16, 1966 that there were no seriously injured U.S. Air Force personnel and those who had been committed to the hospital following the attack had been released. <sup>29/</sup>

### The Response and the Retreat

Immediately following the outbreak of hostilities, the Tan Son Nhut Base Commander occupied the command position in the joint VNAF/USAF command post; the Deputy Base Commander manning the USAF base command post and coordinating recovery actions. <sup>30/</sup>

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With the detonation of the first hostile rounds, in-place air police forces took positions in flight line bunkers and were alert for possible infiltration. The quick-reaction force moved rapidly into position during the barrage. Barracks turnout of the air police was ordered upon termination of the enemy barrage and a full expanded security posture was assumed. <sup>31/</sup>

During the barrage, two U.S. Army UH-1B alert helicopters were launched from the base. One crew reported sighting muzzle flashes in the general area of the Viet Cong weapons positions and expended rockets and machine gun fire into the positions. The muzzle flashes ceased under the helicopter attack. <sup>32/</sup>

An operating counter-mortar radar (AN/N PQ4) set located on Tan Son Nhut failed to acquire a target during the attack (although muzzle flashes were sighted by the radar crew) as the Viet Cong mortar positions were closer than the minimum acquisition range. <sup>33/</sup>

A Vietnamese Army (ARVN) Airborne Brigade whose camp was located contiguous to the base perimeter also sighted the muzzle flashes of the mortars. Permission to react was requested, but not obtained. <sup>34/</sup>

Generally, response to the attack by friendly Vietnamese forces was positive and immediate. At 0125, the 35th Ranger Battalion was ordered to a position west of Saigon and south of Tan Son Nhut from where they began a search of the area which proved to be the Viet Cong primary firing positions. A platoon of tanks was dispatched to Ba Quec to reinforce the outer belt. The 55th RF Battalion was ordered to establish blocking positions along the east-west road leading from Tan Son Nhut. Just after

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0300 hours, two companies of the 7th Airborne Battalion were moved into blocking positions. <sup>35/</sup>

At approximately 0130, a Vietnamese battalion and a tank platoon swept the area where the Viet Cong had positioned themselves. The enemy had departed. At approximately 0650, a three battalion sweep was made without contacting the Viet Cong. <sup>36/</sup>

Later, on April 13, a debriefing of his troops by the Vietnamese Outer Belt Commander disclosed that, at approximately 0030, two squad-size ambush units of the 531 RF Company saw a Viet Cong element near Tan Son Nhut. Both units engaged the Viet Cong with small arms fire, and at the same time requested their company to fire its organic 60mm mortar on the Viet Cong positions. Almost simultaneously with this request, the Viet Cong began the attack on Tan Son Nhut with mortars and recoilless rifles. At about 0040 hours, the requested 60mm mortar was fired at the Viet Cong positions. Although the rounds fell short, it was believed to have hastened termination of the Viet Cong attack and their subsequent withdrawal. <sup>37/</sup>

One isolated incident concerning the Vietnamese forces, which involved the improper relief of an ambush site, might well have contributed to the success of the Viet Cong attack and withdrawal. The company commander had given instructions to the NCO platoon leader to leave the ambushes in place "until the moon comes up; then bring them back in." Although official moonrise on April 13 was 0047 hours, a subsequent debriefing disclosed that the platoon leader withdrew his men at 2400 hours unbeknown to the company commander. Even the company commander's instructions were in violation of the battalion commander's policy in that all ambushes were to be established no

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later than 2000 hours daily and would not be abandoned before 0400 hours the following morning. <sup>38/</sup>

In summing up other responsive actions, Capital Military Region Advisory Detachment personnel working at Tan Son Nhut during and immediately subsequent to the attack reported that the vast majority of U.S. personnel at the air base were calm and conscientious in adhering to pre-arranged active and passive defense plans. Confusion was minimal. Vietnamese Air Force reaction was also good in that they rapidly complied with previously coordinated and rehearsed joint defense plans. U.S. armed helicopter and flareship support was promptly requested and furnished. These were operational within twenty minutes of the time the attack was initiated. Armed helicopters from the 197th Aviation Company continually provided surveillance along suspected enemy withdrawal routes and fired on targets requested by the Vietnamese. <sup>39/</sup>

Damage inflicted on the Viet Cong was undetermined; however, from all reports it must be presumed that the Viet Cong suffered no casualties before, during, or after their brief but successful assault on Tan Son Nhut. The enemy force withdrew at approximately 0050 hours along a route almost parallel with the approach route. A friendly Vietnamese security force located near the withdrawal route saw a large force of Viet Cong at approximately 0200 hours approaching from the north. Because of the large number of Viet Cong, they abandoned their post. A bridge was blown behind them by personnel of the Viet Cong main attacking force, who then completed a safe withdrawal. <sup>40/</sup>

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### After the Attack

The Viet Cong attack against Tan Son Nhut was successfully executed. There were numerous contributing factors. Some of these were: <sup>41/</sup>

- (1) Enemy movement to firing positions was not discovered.
- (2) Ambush sites were not manned as directed.
- (3) Countermortar radar was not successful in locating firing enemy weapons.
- (4) Key installations within Tan Son Nhut had been targeted in detail by the Viet Cong agents.

Immediately following the attack, base officials reported that several lessons had been learned from the attack. The most significant were: <sup>42/</sup>

- (1) Ground alert helicopter gun ships and fire-power aircraft were not adequately responsive to defensive demands associated with a surprise mortar/artillery attack. During the Tan Son Nhut attack, the base received an average of 19 rounds of enemy fire per minute. The five minute scramble time alone served to "give" the enemy 95 rounds on target.
- (2) If ground alert helicopters and/or fire was the best that could be provided, then alert craft should be physically removed from prime target zones on the base and parked in remote areas. Ideally, the parking locations of alert craft should be changed from day to day in a manner unpredictable to the observant enemy.
- (3) A high order of reliance could not be placed in the effectiveness of one countermortar radar for the base. Sufficient radar sets to provide coverage of all sectors containing potential hostile gun positions should be provided. Counter battery artillery should be associated closely with countermortar radar.

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- (4) The USAF security force radio network needed refinement. During the height of the attack, the security force could not have operated effectively against a coordinated infiltration action because its radio frequency was completely saturated with damage reports, artillery impact reports and other transmissions. The base needed two frequencies exclusively for security operations.

In an effort to decrease the probability of another successful attack by the Viet Cong, the Capital Military Region Advisory Detachment at Tan Son Nhut recommended that following actions: <sup>43/</sup>

- (1) Increase the primary defense forces in the outer belt around Tan Son Nhut by one additional battalion and make these Vietnamese Army forces rather than regional forces.
- (2) Increase radar sets emplaced at Tan Son Nhut by two. (No action on 16 Dec 1965. Request for one additional set to-date).
- (3) Relocate base camps of ARVN general reserve units within the Capital Military Region to areas on perimeter of or within the outer belt.
- (4) Joint General Staff (JGS) increase emphasis on establishment, conduct, and command supervision of ambush sites.
- (5) More stringent controls should be established on entrance into and circulation within Tan Son Nhut.
- (6) The Capital Military Region be assigned two additional ARVN battalions to reduce and permanently occupy the Viet Cong base in the Ly Van Manh area. (Previously Recommended)

On April 14, 1966 an inquiry was received from the Headquarters USAF Command Post as to why so many aircraft parked in revetments were damaged in the mortar attack on Tan Son Nhut. Colonel George Budway, the Tan Son

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Nhut Base Commander, replied that the primary reason was the pinpoint accuracy of the attack. He pointed out that the revetments were effective in absorbing some hits and preventing the spread of damage between aircraft parked in revetments. A solution would be increased dispersal between revetments. Colonel Budway pointed out, however, that "limited space at Tan Son Nhut for parking aircraft precludes any immediate accomplishment in this area."<sup>44/</sup>

Of the aircraft damaged during the attack, twenty-three were in revetments. Thirty-nine other aircraft in revetments were not damaged. Eighteen rounds were received within revetment enclosures, while twenty-three rounds hit immediately in front of revetment enclosures. Fifty-eight rounds were delivered in the immediate area of the revetted aircraft, representing approximately twenty percent of the total mortar hits on the base.<sup>45/</sup>

Colonel B. R. Muldoon, Assistant Deputy for Operations, 7th Air Force, pointed out that "the hits suffered by aircraft in the revetments could only have been prevented by covered revetments with steel doors. Two fighters are parked in each revetment space, thus each hit in or in front of the revetment enclosures normally results in two damaged aircraft. A round landing immediately in front of the wall separating the two revetment enclosures can and, in some cases, did damage four aircraft."<sup>46/</sup>

Probably the most significant lesson learned from the attack was the inadequacy of existing measures to place suppressive fire upon enemy mortar or artillery positions. As an interim measure, MACV was requested and did place a fire team (two armed helicopters) on airborne alert over

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the base from 2200 hours to 0500 hours on the night of April 13 and 14. This action was taken as an emergency measure only since it was the Army position that the armed helicopters were capable of remaining aloft for very limited periods and did not possess sufficient firepower to engage a number of targets successively. <sup>47/</sup>

Security and Law Enforcement officials had suggested the maintenance of an airborne-alert firepower capability over the base during prime attack hours. <sup>48/</sup> On the other hand, Tactical Air Control Center officials advised that it would be futile to place an AC-47 over the station since the aircraft could not fire until clearance had been granted by CMR through TACC. It was indicated that the delays inherent in this procedure, as compared with the expected short duration of an attack, did not warrant keeping an armed aircraft over the base. <sup>49/</sup>

However, the Deputy Senior Advisor, CMR, stated that an airborne-alert aircraft could communicate directly with the JOC at CMR and request permission to fire from the U.S. Duty Officer. This officer then would clear this request with his counterpart at the JOC. He stated that such clearance would normally take a moment or two only. <sup>50/</sup>

Based on the foregoing, the Director of Security and Law Enforcement made the following summation: <sup>51/</sup>

"We agree with the Army position that armed helicopters on airborne alert do not constitute a practical source of suppressive fire. We do not, however, believe that the presence of a flareship in the area provides any appreciable deterrent to enemy attack. Present arrangements provide no capability for timely suppressive fire. It is strongly recommended that an armed aircraft be placed on airborne alert over Tan Son Nhut and

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that necessary arrangements (as a special case if necessary) be made to enable the alert aircraft to direct prompt suppressive fire on weapons positions engaged in attack on Tan Son Nhut."

With the successful execution of the attack on Tan Son Nhut, the Viet Cong had shown that they were capable of launching damaging attacks against any U.S. air base in Vietnam with relative impunity. The attack not only confirmed earlier official estimates concerning the Viet Cong threat to Tan Son Nhut but provided further evidence of the vulnerability of all U.S. air installations in Vietnam. As early as December 18, 1964, the Seventh Air Force Commander had correctly assessed this vulnerability.

He said:

"...I personally believe the Viet Cong can attack any of our installations at any time they want to take the risk and I believe sudden mortar attacks on any of these installations would have a good chance of being successful before discovery of mortar squads and before counter attacks could be launched. I have expressed these fears to COMUSMACV and DEPCOMUSMACV and they assure me they are prodding ARVN officials continually to maintain and improve base defense...."

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## ATTACK AGAINST TAN SON NHUT

### Footnotes

(References as noted provided in one copy to AFCHO and in DOPEC file cy.)

- 1/ (S) Msg, 375 Cmbt Spt Gp to CINCPACAF, Subj: Serious Incident Report 66-18 (U), 13 Apr 66 (Doc 1).
- 2/ (S) History of the 6250th Cmbt Spt Gp, 1 Jul-31 Dec 65, PP. 32-33.
- 3/ (U) Hqs, 7AF (DOI) News Release Apr 66-072 (Doc 2).
- 4/ (S) Proj CHECO Study, "Follow-up to Bien Hoa Mortar Attack", by Kenneth Sams, 30 Jun 65, PP. 7-8.
- 5/ Ibid.
- 6/ Ibid.
- 7/ (U) Interview, SSgt D. W. Stephens, Tan Son Nhut Base Historian with Security Forces Officer, 15 Apr 66.
- 8/ (S) Proj CHECO Study, "Follow-up to Bien Hoa Mortar Attack", by Kenneth Sams, 30 Jun 65, PP. 8.
- 9/ (S) Ltr, 6250CSG (C) BSL to 2AD, (S), Subj: Augmentation Security Forces - TSN (U), 9 Feb 66, filed at BSL.
- 10/ (S) Msg, 2AD (IGSLOO615) to 6250CSG, Subj: Base Defense (U), 11 Dec 65, filed at BSL.
- 11/ (S) Ltr, 6250CSG to 2AD, Subj: Augmentation Security Forces-TSN (U), 9 Feb 66, filed at BSL.
- 12/ (S) Ltr, Hq 7AF (DSLSS) to Hq 7AF (CS), Subj: Resume of Viet Cong Attack Against Tan Son Nhut Afd (U), 20 Apr 66 (Doc 3).
- 13/ Ibid.
- 14/ (C) Map prepared by Civ Eng, Hq 7AF, for briefing compiled by LtCol Melvin O. Owens, 377th Cmbt Spt Gp Vice Cmdr, 21 Apr 66.
- 15/ (S) Ltr, Hq 7AF (DSLSS) to (CS), Subj: Resume of Viet Cong Attack Against Tan Son Nhut Afd (U), 20 Apr 66 (Doc 3).

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- 17/ Ibid.
- 18/ Ibid.
- 19/ (S) Ltr, Hq 7AF (DSL) to (CS), Subj: Resume of Viet Cong Attack  
Against Tan Son Nhut Afld (U), 20 Apr 66 (Doc 3).
- 20/ Ibid.
- 21/ Ibid.
- 22/ (S) Briefing compiled by LtCol Melvin O. Owens, 377th Cmbt Spt  
Gp Vice Cmdr, 21 Apr 66 (Doc 5).
- 23/ (S) Ltr, CMRA to COMUSMACV, Subj: Viet Cong Attack Against Tan  
Son Nhut Air Base (U), 15 Apr 66 (Doc 4).
- 24/ (U) Hq 7AF (DOI) News Release Apr 66-072, (Doc 2).
- 25/ (S) Ltr, TSN Base Cmdr to 7AF Command Center, Subj: Inquiry from  
General Compton (U), 15 Apr 66 (Doc 6).
- 26/ (S) Ltr, Hq 7AF (DSL) to (CS), Subj: Resume of Viet Cong Attack  
Against Tan Son Nhut Afld (U), 20 Apr 66 (Doc 3).
- 27/ Ibid.
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- 29/ (S) Ltr, Hq 375 Cmbt Spt Gp to TSN Base Cmdr, Subj: Report of  
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- 30/ (S) Briefing compiled by LtCol Melvin O. Owens, 377th Cmbt Spt  
Gp Vice Cmdr, 21 Apr 66 (Doc 5).
- 31/ (S) Ltr, Hq 7AF (DSL) to (CS), Subj: Resume of Viet Cong Attack  
Against Tan Son Nhut (U), 20 Apr 66 (Doc 3).
- 32/ Ibid.
- 33/ Ibid.
- 34/ Ibid.


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- 39/ Ibid.
- 40/ Ibid.
- 41/ Ibid.
- 42/ (S) Ltr, Hq 7AF (DSLS) to (CS), Subj: Resume of Viet Cong Attack Against Tan Son Nhut Afld (U), 20 Apr 66 (Doc 3).
- 43/ (S) Ltr, CMRA to COMUSMACV, Subj: Attack Against Tan Son Nhut Air Base (U), 13 Apr 66 (Doc 4).
- 44/ (S) Ltr, TSN Base Cmdr to 7AF Command Center, Subj: Inquiry from General Compton (U), 15 Apr 66 (Doc 6).
- 45/ (S) Msg, 7AF to AFCP, Secret DO 107, Apr 66 (Doc 8).
- 46/ Ibid.
- 47/ (S) Ltr, Hq 7AF (DSLS) to (DO), Subj: Airborne Alert, Tan Son Nhut AB (U), 15 Apr 66 (Doc 9).
- 48/ (S) Ltr, Hq 7AF (DSLS) to (CS), Subj: Resume of Viet Cong Attack Against Tan Son Nhut Afld (U), 20 Apr 66 (Doc 3).
- 49/ (S) Ltr, Hq 7AF (DSLS) to (DO), Subj: Airborne Alert, Tan Son Nhut AB (U), 15 Apr 66 (Doc 9).
- 50/ Ibid.
- 51/ Ibid.
- 52/ (S) Proj CHEGO Study, "Follow-up to Bien Hoa Mortar Attack", by Kenneth Sams, 30 Jun 65, PP. 14-15.

**LEGEND**

- IMPACT AREA OF 81MM  
81MM MORTAR ROUNDS  
82MM " " " " " "  
75MM RECOILESS RIFLE ROUNDS TOTAL 243
- \*USAF CASUALTIES  
56 FRAGMENT INJURIES TOTAL 90  
34 EVASIVE ACTION  
0 KIA
- ⊙ U.S. ARMY CASUALTIES  
55 FRAGMENT INJURIES TOTAL 61  
6 KIA
- ADDITIONAL CASUALTIES  
NAVY - 1 KIA  
VN - 1 KIA

**CONFIDENTIAL**



5 U.S. ARMY KILLED  
55 WOUNDED

1 U.S. ARMY KIA

**CONFIDENTIAL**

**TAN SON NHUT AIRFIELD**

**CONFIDENTIAL**

**AERIAL VIEW OF TAN SON NHUT AIR FIELD SHOWING SOME  
REVTMENTS FOR AIRCRAFT PROTECTION**



**CONFIDENTIAL**

**CONFIDENTIAL**




**AERIAL VIEW OF TAN SON NHUT SHOWING REVETMENTS USED  
FOR RF-4C AIRCRAFT PROTECTION**

**CONFIDENTIAL**


**CONFIDENTIAL**

**TAIL SECTION OF RF-4C SHOWING SHRAPNEL DAMAGE FROM  
MORTAR ATTACK ON TAN SON NHUT**



**CONFIDENTIAL**

**CONFIDENTIAL**



**DEMOLISHED VIETNAMESE AIR FORCE C-47 RESULTING FROM  
TAN SON NHUT'S MORTAR ATTACK**

**CONFIDENTIAL**

**CONFIDENTIAL**



**DEMOLISHED VIETNAMESE AIR FORCE C-47 RESULTING FROM  
TAN SON NHUT'S MORTAR ATTACK**

**CONFIDENTIAL**


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**TAIL SECTION DAMAGE TO USAF C-123 FROM DIRECT HIT  
DURING MORTAR ATTACK ON TAN SON NHUT**



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**ESSO FUEL TANK STILL BURNING THE FOLLOWING DAY AFTER THE  
NIGHT MORTAR BARRAGE OF TAN SON NHUT AIRFIELD 13 APRIL**

**1966**

**CONFIDENTIAL**

SECRET

# VC ATTACK

ON  
TAN SON NHUT  
AIRFIELD, RVN

PROPERTY	CLASSIFICATION	DATE
NO. 16	SECRET	1968
NO. 16	SECRET	1968



0000-0000 15 APR 68

PROJECT CONTROL HARVEST  
**CATALOGED**  
 NO. 0 DESTROY  
 230000  
 No. \_\_\_\_\_

CATALOG

SECRET

SECRET